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Revisiting the Omnes et Singulatim Bond: The Production of Irregular Conducts and the 
Biopolitics of the Governed 
Martina Tazzioli, University Aix-Marseille 
 
ABSTRACT: This article starts from the non-juridical meaning of subjectivity that counter-
conducts entail and from the asymmetrical forms of refusal they generate. Foucault’s 
understanding of counter-conducts as productive practices, internal to the regime of norms 
that they oppose, enables analysing struggles and modes of life that were not defined by 
Foucault in these terms, or those counter-conducts that are more recent. In the first section, the 
article engages with the meaning of “counter-conduct,” situating it within the omnes et 
singulatim nexus, interrogating how the level of multiplicities is at stake in contemporary 
forms of counter-conduct. Then, it focuses on The Punitive Society, showing that the modes of 
life and strategies of flight against the capitalist system described by Foucault allow us to 
grasp the excess of discordant conducts with respect to technologies of power that try to 
discipline them. In the final section, the article explores the entanglement between 
singularities and multiplicities at play in the government of refugees, focusing on the spatial 
disobedience enacted by rejected refugees at Choucha refugee camp in Tunisia. Refugees’ 
strategic embracement of the condition of subjects eminently governed by the humanitarian 
rationale illuminates a form of biopolitics of the governed. 
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Introduction 
As it is well known, the notion of counter-conduct is introduced by Foucault in the Lecture of 
March 1st 1979 to designate revolts of conducts against technologies of government that “do 
not exercise sovereignty and do not exploit, but ‘conduct’.”1 The political technology that 
Foucault is talking about is pastoral power, the genealogy of which he traces in Security, 
Territory, Population. This political technology, defined by Foucault in this work as a 
“government of men,”2 is characterized by a twofold level of ‘hold’ over people’s lives: omnes 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978, edited by Michel 
Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 266. 
2 Ibid., 71. 
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et singulatim,3 that is, the government of singularities and the government of populations. 
However, when Foucault introduces the notion of counter-conduct in the Lecture of March 1st 
the focus of the analysis is centred primarily on the government of singular conducts and the 
omnes dimension is in part left aside. This does not mean that the collective level is absent in 
revolts of conduct; indeed, as Foucault stresses, in the XVI century the individual refusal of 
“being governed like that and at that cost”4 was very often enacted by subjects who were part 
of specific religious groups and communities. Nevertheless, counter-conducts are defined as 
practices of refusal and disobedience against certain norms of behaviour that structure the 
individual’s field of action. As much shared and spread as they could be among people 
belonging to the same community, the religious counter-conducts that Foucault recognizes 
start as the refusal of certain norms that shape people’s bodies and lives.  
In this article I will discuss how the notion of counter-conduct provides a useful lens 
through which to analyse struggles and modes of life that were not defined by Foucault in 
these terms, or those counter-conducts that are more recent. In particular, I will show that, 
despite the prefix “counter,” the notion of counter-conduct is helpful for revising the 
relationship between powers and resistances beyond any reactive model of struggles against 
biopower, as well as beyond a juridicization of subjectivities. Then, I problematize the use and 
the meaning of “counter-conduct,” situating it within the omnes et singulatim nexus, 
interrogating how the level of multiplicities as an object of governmentality on the one hand, 
and the dimension of collective struggles on the other, is at stake in contemporary forms of 
counter-conduct. After commenting on the way in which Foucault deals with this in Security, 
Territory, Population, I will dwell on his La société punitive. In those Lectures at the Collège de 
France, the modes of life and strategies of flight against the emergent capitalist productive 
system described by Foucault enable us to grasp how resistances based on the enactment of 
discordant conducts are produced by an excess that technologies of power are then forced to 
contain. In the final section, I will explore the specific entanglement between singularities and 
multiplicities that are at play in the government of refugees, focusing on the spatial disobedience 
enacted by rejected refugees at Choucha refugee camp in Tunisia. I will show that their 
strategic embracement of the condition of subjects eminently governed by the humanitarian 
rationale, despite being out of its concern, illuminates a form of biopolitics of the governed. 
  
Non-juridical subjectivities and the productive twist of counter-conducts 
From the point of view of an analysis of governmentality, the choice to look at them through 
the lens of counter-conducts enables the displacement of two main images of power-
resistances that are implicitly reiterated in political theory literature. The first one consists in 
                                                 
3 “On the one hand, the shepherd must keep his eye on all and on each, omnes et singulatim, which will be the 
great problem both of the techniques of power in Christian pastorship, and of the, let’s say, modern 
techniques of power deployed in the technologies of population” (Ibid.,173). See also Michel Foucault, 
“Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of ‘Political Reason’ [1979],” in Power: Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 3 (New York: The New Press, 2000), 298-325.  
4 Michel Foucault, “What Is Critique?” in Lotringer Sylvère and John Rajchman (eds.), The Politics of Truth 
(New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), 41-82. 
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the juridicization of power relations that led Foucault to state that “we still have not cut off the 
head of the king.”5 The juridical frame is constantly instantiated any time that power is 
depicted as a set of constrictions that are exercised on subjects of right. The fact that Foucault 
introduced the notion of “counter-conduct” at the same time that he mobilized the frame of 
governmentality should be seen as part of his radical challenge to the juridical framing of 
power relations. 6  As Arnold Davidson puts it, the “space of counter-conduct cannot be 
reduced to the juridical sphere” and “the attempt to create a new mode of life is much more 
pertinent than the question of individual rights.”7 By reframing power relations in terms of 
governmentality Foucault goes beyond any image of the subject as a subject of right, as he 
explicitly points out in 1984:  
governmentality entails the relationship of the self to itself, and I intend this concept of 
governmentality to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize and 
instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each 
other. 
 Instead, Foucault goes on, “if you try to analyse power not on the basis of freedom, strategies 
and governmentality but on the basis of political institutions, you can only conceive of the 
subject as a subject of law”8. 
Together with this anti-juridical approach to subjectivities, Foucault’s reflection on 
counter-conducts enables the dismissal of any oppositional conception of the relationship 
between powers and resistances. The prefix “counter” in the term “counter-conduct” is in part 
misleading if it is conceived as a mere reactive form of refusal, instantiating a sort of 
symmetrical resistance to power’s hold on conducts. Yet, in the Lecture of March 1st Foucault 
stresses the productivity of counter-conducts and their irreducibility to the borders and 
conditions imposed on them by those very techniques of governmentality from which they try 
to wriggle out. Counter-conducts are always in excess with regard to the norms that they resist 
by twisting and altering their expected functioning. Indeed, the modes of life through which 
subjects try to circumvent the regime of norms mobilizes the same elements that power uses, 
but they do so in a way that troubles and jams the effects of normalization and constraints on 
subjectivities. In order to grasp the productivity of counter-conducts we have to shift our 
attention away from the space in which counter-conducts operate and the means that they 
strategically use, towards the undecidable openness stemming from their practices; namely, the 
space they open up as an outcome of their modes of life. What is generated through practices of 
counter-conduct cannot be fully accommodated in the regime of norms and truths that subjects are 
shaped by. In particular, practices of counter-conducts escape any evaluation of them that can be done 
                                                 
5 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 98. 
6 Corey McCall, “Conduct,” in Foucault Lexicon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
7 Arnold I. Davidson, “In Praise of Counter-Conduct,” History of the Human Sciences, vol. 24, no. 4 (2011), 33. 
8 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics for the Concern of Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Ethics, Subjectivity and 
Truth; The Essential Work of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 1 (New York: The New Press, 1997, 300). 
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in terms of calculability—costs and benefit’s logic—and of the counting-subject’s representation in the 
space of the political.9  
It can be contended that by skirting the edges counter-conducts—tactically and from a 
genealogical point of view—rest on and mobilize the same elements that produce them, and 
those with which they are subjected as subjects of conduct. Instead, strategically and from an 
ontological standpoint, counter-conducts introduce a constitutive asymmetry, as practices and 
forms of life that appear as discordant regarding the normative codes they counter-act and 
twist. I say “strategically” recalling Foucault’s definition of strategy as a comprehensive effect 
that “gains support from precise and tenuous relations serving […] as its prop anchor point.”10 
Coming back to Foucault’s explanation of the internality of revolts of conduct in relation to the 
techniques of power they aim to counter-act, it should be noticed that he expressly leaves out 
of his genealogy what he calls the “external blockages” of the pastorate, meaning “the passive 
resistance of populations still undergoing conversion to Christianity in the late Middle Ages. 
Even when converted, for a long time these populations were resistant to a number of 
obligations imposed on them by the pastorate.”11 Thus, Foucault actually does not exclude that 
there could be insurrections of conduct and resistances to pastoral power that act at the very 
margins, or even partially outside the field of power technologies and norms of conducts they 
resist; however, he chooses to focus exclusively on the internal ones. But what does such an 
elision imply? As the abovementioned citation explains, Foucault mainly refers to the colonial 
geography of the pastorate, excluding from his analysis the resistance of “populations still 
undergoing conversion to Christianity.” Nevertheless, I suggest that there is also a sort of 
hidden elision in Foucault’s genealogy of counter-conducts; that is, external blockages whose 
exteriority is not primarily geographical but are, first of all, social and political and actually 
take place within the same space addressed by Foucault’s analysis. In a nutshell, this concerns 
the sphere of productivity and the space of mobility; these are forms of dissidence enacted by 
subjects who resist not the religious economy of conducts, but the disciplinary power of the 
system of production. In the 1972-1973 Lectures at the College de France, La société punitive—
so, well before the introduction of the concepts of “governmentality” and of “counter-
conduct”—Foucault brings attention to the criminalization of those unruly behaviours and 
strategies of flight that, in the XVII and in the XVIII century, resisted becoming a labour force 
bound to the apparatuses of production. According to Foucault, these strategies of flight were 
criminalized at that time, and were illegalized for the “common existence” and the possible 
“counter-society” they could generate.12 
 
The political projects of counter-societies and the revolutionary-eschatological model: collective counter-
conducts? 
                                                 
9 Athena Athanasiou, and Judith Butler, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political (New York: Polity 
Press, 2013); Judith Butler, “Human Shield,” Lecture at the London School of Economics (February 4th, 2015). 
10 The Will to Knowledge, 99. 
11 Security, Territory, Population, 258. 
12 Michel Foucault, La société punitive: Cours au Collège de France, 1972–1973 (Paris: Gallimard, 2013). 
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Before developing this point, I would like to briefly focus on modern and collective forms of 
counter-conduct discussed by Foucault in the last Lecture. Indeed, after situating counter-
conducts within the field of pastoral power, as a political technology characterized by a 
twofold hold on populations and singular conducts (omnes et singulatim), in the Lecture of 
March 1st Foucault leaves aside the issue of revolts of conduct exercised at the level of the 
population: he focuses the analysis of counter-conducts on the second pole (singulatim) 
positing obedience—of the singular individual to the master or to a regime of norms—as the 
cornerstone of pastoral power. And after the Lecture of March 8th the term counter-conducts 
disappears. Nevertheless, in the last Lecture (April 5th) Foucault comes back to that neologism 
and to his earlier exploration about modern practices of counter-conduct in the XVIII century 
that emerged in reaction to Raison d’ Etat.13 Differently from the other examples of counter-
conducts that Foucault illustrates in Security, Territory, Population—where the collective 
dimension refers to closed communities—here he envisages forms of collective resistance that 
involve a national population—in opposition to the emergent Raison d’État—or political 
projects of future counter-societies that would concern the people against the state. Moreover, 
these cases clearly show that although counter-conducts hinge on the same elements that are 
mobilized by power and are internal to the field of governmentality, they are far from being 
merely oppositional struggles or subtractive resistances. In particular, it is around the tyranny 
of a naturalized conception of temporality—the time of governmentality—and of truth that 
these models of society centre their resistance to the Raison d’Etat. The implicit, but quite 
immediate, resonance with Walter Benjamin’s revolutionary eschatology should be read, I 
suggest, not as a utopian move out of history but as a political project that, despite drawing on 
the same elements used by the Raison d’ État, fashions a (political) imaginary that is out of any 
logic of costs and benefit, and whose outcome is not contemplated within the borders from 
which it emerges. These two underplayed aspects of counter-conducts that I recalled—the 
“external blockages” and the modern revolutionary eschatologies that Foucault only partially 
tackles—give us the possibility to revise and problematize the articulation between omnes and 
singulatim in counter-conducts. And, simultaneously, this allows us to come to grips with 
techniques of governmentality that work through different mechanisms of subjectivation than 
the individualizing ones at play in pastoral power.  
 
Strategies of flight up against labour exploitation: the production of illegal and immoral conducts 
In order to develop the analysis along this line, I will start by exploring the occurrences in 
which Foucault takes into account forms of existence and strategies of flight that, despite not 
being named by him as counter-conducts, can help to broaden the field of resistance to 
techniques of governmentality that apply to life and to its productivity. Indeed, as I sketched 
above, in La société punitive the biopolitical frame is de facto introduced in advance with a 
                                                 
13 “I wonder whether we could analyse counter-conducts in the modern system of governmentality […] from 
the middle of the eighteenth century a whole series of counter-conducts have developed whose essential 
objective is precisely the rejection of raison d’État and its fundamental requirements, and which gets support 
from the very same thing as that raison d’État” (Ibid., 453). 
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detailed analysis of the mechanisms of normalization and government of the lives activated 
with the emergence of capitalism. Thus, my suggestion is to reread counter-conducts in the 
light of subjects’ refusals to be disciplined by mechanisms of production14 that historically 
have been enacted through strategies of mobility, and have been criminalized as “dangerous 
behaviours.” What distinguishes the hold on conducts exercised by capitalist mechanisms of 
production and what characterises the forms of refusal and resistance against them, is, I 
contend, the control over life-time and the government of conducts at the level of their 
potentialities—e.g. life that can be potentially transformed into labour force. In La société 
punitive Foucault mobilizes a vocabulary that evokes the biopolitical taxonomy and, together, 
insurrections of conduct. Certainly, it would be incorrect to transpose there the biopolitical 
grid since this latter is introduced by Foucault with the analysis on biopower as a political 
technology that is related to the emergence of the object “population.”15 Yet, what is important 
for the purpose of this analysis is the centrality of the notion of “life” in terms of human 
activity and of recalcitrant subjectivities to be subjected to disciplinary mechanisms that aim to 
“fix” the subjects to apparatuses of production and, more broadly, to judge and classify them 
according their deviation from the norm.16  
In this regard I would like to highlight three points that help us to trace similarities and 
differences with counter-conducts. Firstly, the forms of refusal that Foucault illustrates are not 
properly insurrections of conduct, if we mean by that the forms of life and ways of conducting 
oneself that happen ‘within and against’ a certain community of belonging—a religious or a 
political one. Rather, the forms of refusal described by Foucault in La société punitive are at the 
same time more radical and more general when compared to the counter-conducts of the 
pastoral age. Indeed, they are not enacted from within a specific community of belonging but, 
rather, they subtract from the hold on life-time exercised through the mechanisms of fixation 
to the system of production and practices of unruly mobility. These forms of disobedience are 
enacted through specific behaviours and conducts—like flight, for instance—that neither 
accept the horizon of governmentality they try to escape—i.e. the capitalist system of 
production—nor tactically ground themselves on the same elements mobilized by power, as in 
the case of counter-conducts. In the face of the economic and social readjustment of western 
societies around the emergent capitalist societies, the refusals that Foucault talks about 
unsettles and dodges the new mechanisms of capture, facing off recalcitrant subjectivities with 
the disciplinary hold on people’s life and time. Nevertheless, this does not mean that those 
subjects are “outside” the field of governmentality that they unsettle through practices of 
                                                 
14 And in particular to be “fixed” to the productive apparatuses. 
15 Moreover, it is only with the reframing of the analysis on power in terms of governmentality that 
biopolitics can be situated, both theoretically and historically. 
16 “The time and the life of man are not by essence made of work; rather, they are made of pleasure, 
discontinuity, holidays, rest, needs, instants, hazard, violence etc. Now, it is precisely this explosive force 
that must be transformed into a labour force that is constant and continuously offered on the market. Life 
must be synthetized into labour force, and this implicates the coercion enacted by this system of 
sequestration” (Foucault, La société punitive, 236). And, concerning the norm: “the individual is always 
described in function of his possible or real deviation from what is defined [...] as the normal” (ibid., 221). 
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flight or “deviant” and unruly conducts; rather, those struggles through movement are staged by 
subjects who are eminently governed by mechanisms of normalization, since, as Foucault 
explains, it is at the level of life itself, at the level of bodies and time, that disciplinary 
mechanisms act. But those troubling subjectivities are seen as “dangerous” and criminalized 
precisely because they mobilize and create forms of life and conduct that are discordant with 
respect to the normative codes of the productive apparatuses, and are beyond the thresholds 
of acceptability. In the wake of this, I suggest that they are more than revolts of conduct by 
those individuals and groups who are placed within the horizon of a certain regime of power-
knowledge; those troubling subjectivities appear as counter-conducts precisely due to the fact 
that they escape capture by the mechanisms of production.  
This leads me to the second point: these troubling subjectivities evoke a dimension of 
“counter” insofar as they disobey the rule of territorial fixation and the coercive mechanisms 
that aim to “synthetize life into labour force.”17 However, even in a more evident way than 
those counter-conducts described in Security, Territory, Population, these practices of resistance 
refuse the disciplinary dressage by enacting modes of life that governmental forces need to 
tame, contain, or reabsorb. Thus, the crafting of mechanisms of sequestration emerges as a 
“counter-manoeuvre”18 and as a strategy of containment for modes of life that escape the 
transformation into labour force. This strategy could be embraced by many, which would 
result in a sort of counter-collectivity.19 But what effectively destabilizes modern capitalist 
society? Is the scarcity of labour force the most troubling effect of those forms of refusal? 
Actually, I suggest that beyond the indisputable material scarcity that they provoke, Foucault 
proposes another core element that directly concerns political subjectivities. What appears as 
potentially dangerous, and what is subsequently criminalized, is the will not to be governed in 
such a way20 that vagabonds, migrants, lazy people, and depraved workers represent. As he 
writes, “the vagabond is less one who is deprived of means of subsistence and who is left out 
than the one who on his own volition refuses the job supply.”21 In this way, we see that the 
real troubling component of practices of mobility and laziness relies not (only) on their 
economic consequences but on the political will that pushes those subjects to leave and to 
refuse work; and it is precisely building on the unwillingness to be governed in such a way 
and unwillingness to perform certain tasks that processes of subjectivation, which concern 
both individuals and a potential “counter-society,” are activated in friction with the 
mechanisms of subjection and subjectivation put into place by governmental techniques. As it 
is well known, political will—framed first of all as a will not “to be governed like that and at 
that cost”22—is an issue around which Foucault reconceptualizes his earlier reflections on 
                                                 
17 Foucault, La société punitive, 236. 
18 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College de France, 1973–1974 (New York: Picador, 2006). 
19 Foucault, La société punitive, 219. 
20 See Foucault, What is Critique? [1978] in which Foucault uses the expression “not to be governed in such a 
way at that cost.” 
21 Foucault, La société punitive, 49. 
22 Foucault, What is Critique? 
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power and resistance from 1978, contained in his seminal lecture “What is Critique?” and in 
light of the Iranian uprisings.23 In this regard, as Daniele Lorenzini aptly stresses, the will not 
to be governed in such a way and the question of counter-conducts cannot be thought of 
separately.24 Therefore, it is precisely this recalcitrant will that lies behind the criminalized 
strategies of flight examined by Foucault, as well as structuring a potential field of 
subjectivation that turns out to be discordant and intolerable in the emergent capitalist 
societies. To put it differently, those forms of refusal are crafted as intolerable illegalisms to the 
extent that they enact practices of freedom refusing what Nicholas De Genova calls “the 
obscene of inclusion,”25 namely the concealed exploitation of labour force,26 and what Peter 
Linebaugh names “the oppression of the living by dead labour.”27 
A third point, which stems from the former, is that apparatuses [dispositives] of 
normalization respond to strategies of flight and modes of life by outlawing and criminalizing 
them. In this way, new social identities are created, defining those subjects through the 
criminalized activity they perform. 28  In this sense, those strategies of flight emerge as 
discordant and troubling practices of freedom—that cannot be tolerated in modern societies—
after being illegalized and subjected to a process of moralization. Hence, to trace a filiation 
with counter-conducts it must be noted that in these modes of life the dimension of “counter” 
refers to flights, behaviours, and modes of life that are criminalized as “intolerable 
                                                 
23 Ultimately, the journalistic reportages that he made for the Italian newspaper Il Corriere della Sera in Iran in 
1978 and in 1979 shed an important light on the potential political force of the notion of counter-conduct, 
since Foucault looks at the Iranian uprisings from the point of view of the refusal of the Iranian people to 
continue to obey that regime of government. However, Foucault’s experience in Iran started after the 
conclusion of the Lectures series Security, Territory, Population and in the writings on Iran he does not use the 
term counter-conduct. But despite the abandonment of the term counter-conduct, in his articles for Il Corriere 
della Sera Foucault describes the Iranian uprisings finding and highlighting in the Iranian people many of the 
same elements that structure the field of counter-conducts, like the will of not to be governed in that way, 
and linking them to a dimension of political creativity that, according to him, was at stake in that movement. 
Certainly, in the writings on the Iranian uprisings the dimension of modes of life as enacted by individuals is 
in part superseded by a focus on the “collective will” of the Iranian people (see Michel Foucault, “Inutile de 
se soulever?” in Dits et Ecrits, vol.2, (Paris, Gallimard, 2004), 790-794 and “L’esprit d’un monde sans esprit,” 
in Dits et Ecrits, vol.2, 743-754. 
24 Daniele Lorenzini, “From Counter-Conduct to Critical Attitude,” forthcoming in Foucault Studies. 
25 Nicholas De Genova, “Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion,” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 36, no. 7 (2013), 6. 
26 Nicholas De Genova coins the expression in the context of migration and labour migration management, 
defining the obscene of inclusion “as the public secret of a sustained recruitment of ‘illegal’ migrants' 
undocumented labour” (Ibid.). However, the same concept can be adapted and used even more broadly, to 
describe the processes of exploitation of popular classes and of non-citizens that have historically 
characterized capitalist societies. 
27 Peter Linebaugh, The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century (London: Verso 
Books, 2006), 1. 
28 Indeed, Foucault explains disciplinary power posited a “primary and fundamental identity between 
moving and refusing to work” (Foucault, La société punitive, 49). 
Tazzioli: Production of Irregular Conducts 
106 
illegalisms.” Thus, the “counter” is the result of processes of illegalization and moralization of 
those practices of mobility, and strategies of existence, that are declared deviant with regard to 
the norm. Yet, if on the one hand the primary object of techniques of control are individual 
conducts—acting at the level of their bodies and their life-time as well as through the 
moralization of their habits—on the other hand the thresholds of tolerability of the “greyness 
of illegalisms” depend not on the examination of singularities but on the margins for 
managing an irregular population.  
As Foucault repeatedly reminds us throughout his work, freedom is never reached 
once and for all—it cannot be stabilized in a condition—it must be continuously practiced and 
exercised:  
freedom is practice […] the freedom of men is never assured by the laws and the 
institutions that are intended to guarantee them. That is why almost all of these laws and 
institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but 
simply because ‘freedom’ is what must be exercised […] I think it can never be inherent in 
the structure of things to (itself) guarantee the exercise of freedom. The guarantee of 
freedom is freedom.29 
This is particularly important in the context of the revolts of conducts, insofar as they involve 
a certain deviance from the norm, or better are disqualified and criminalized as “deviant.” 
Indeed, as Arnold Davidson highlights, the pathologization of (counter)-conducts is one of the 
most powerful means for neutralizing their disruptive force.30 Therefore, the possibility that 
singular escapes and refusals could lead to the emergence of “counter-societies” is precisely 
what power technologies prevent by generating categories of deviance through which the 
troubling behaviours are criminalized and disqualified as immoral conduct. But, once again, 
the procedures of illegalization and the mechanisms of sequestration—the fixation of bodies to 
productive apparatuses—are not eminently based on forms of obedience that, as in the case of 
pastoral power, bind the subject to his own truth that he is requested to verbalize. Rather, in 
La société punitive Foucault brings to light mechanisms of discipline and containment of unruly 
conducts that work through categorization and fixation that actualise in a hold on life-time. 
Subjects are allocated to these already-existent categories generating “criminal identities” and 
immoral conducts by establishing a chain made of unruly behaviours that are supposed to 
implicate each other31: for instance, the flight and the refusal to work, Foucault explains, are 
considered inseparable depraved actions that, together, make of the subject an irregular 
conduct. Therefore, although mechanisms of discipline and normalization have a hold on 
individuals—fixing them to apparatuses of production or illegalizing their conducts—their 
outcome consists in the emergence of social-types (the dangerous individual, the criminal, the 
vagabond) that conflate in the figure of the social enemy. This latter appears as the 
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crystallization of different “generalizable singularities,” 32  that is to say, profiles of 
dangerousness that are produced through the generalization of singular deviant behaviours 
that are then mobilized for redefining those irregularisms of conduct. 
In fact, in the context of emergent disciplinary mechanisms described by Foucault, 
conducts surface as an outcome of the mechanisms of illegalization and moralization of 
workers and other unruly subjectivities. Troubling behaviours are transformed as conducts to 
discipline and punish, since the conduct is not a primary given, but the result of a complex set 
of regulations that act upon life. To sum up, La société punitive enables us to widen the 
spectrum of counter-conducts while at the same time stretching their boundaries by bringing 
in forms of refusal and strategies of flight that generate other modes of life that appear 
intolerable in early capitalist societies. Firstly, as much situated (and entrapped) in the 
relations of subjection and economic exploitation as they could be, they are differentiated from 
revolts of conduct against the pastorate as these counter-practices do not depend on their 
situated regime of knowledge and mechanisms of subjectivation; on the contrary, they can be 
considered counter-conducts to the extent that they refuse the disciplinary horizon of 
(economic) productivity, putting in place modes of life that undermine those mechanisms of 
capture. Secondly, as I explained above, the collective dimension of counter-conducts does not 
refer here to some community of belonging, and it is not something that exists from the 
beginning; on the contrary, it is the effect of those singular strategies of refusal that start to be 
enacted by many. It is exactly this unpredictable outcome that could lead to the formation of 
alternative sub-societies that is dreaded by apparatuses [dispositives] of production and that 
disrupt their functioning.  
But there is also another collective dimension related to these unruly modes of life that 
remains in the background as a sort of ever-present dreadful specter: this is the mob conceived 
as the multiplicity that is not governable as a population and that appears in excess with 
regard to biopolitical mechanisms of control.33 The specter of the mob, that unruly modes of 
life evokes, implicitly percolates the carceral archipelago—that as Foucault illustrates in La 
société punitive includes different mechanisms of sequestration well beyond the institution of 
the prison—to respond to strategies of refusal and troubling modes of life. After all, this point 
leads us back to Security, Territory, Population and to the irreducibility of the people to 
population as an object of modern governmentality. In the Lecture of January 18th, 1978 
Foucault refers to a fundamental recalcitrance exercised by some people—not taken 
individually but as the many, namely, as part of an undecidable multiplicity—“who resist the 
regulation of the population, who try to elude the apparatus through which the population 
                                                 
32 Martina Tazzioli, “The government of the mob? Produzione del resto e suo eccesso,” in Euronomade (last 
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exists, is preserved, subsists.”34 It is quite significant, I contend, that Foucault addresses in 
terms of “conduct” this collective recalcitrance to the becoming population of the people under the 
emergent governmental rationale:  
the people comprise those who conduct themselves in relation to the management of the 
population, at the level of the population, as if they were not part of the population as a 
collective subject-object, as if they put themselves outside of it, and consequently the people 
is those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system.35  
Then, this aspect remains ultimately unaddressed by Foucault in the other Lectures and 
consequently the elaboration of a collective counter-conduct as a form of resistance to the 
political technologies for transforming people into population is not further developed. 
However, Foucault’s reference to the refusal to become a population should be the subject of 
analysis in trying to understand biopolitical resistances to mechanisms of life’s regulation. 
Indeed, Foucault remarks that the ways in which “the people”—thus, as a collective entity, 
and not simply “people”—resists the formation of a population should not be confused with 
the political subject of social contract theory that, at some point, breaks the contract and places 
him/herself outside of the law. How should we read this brief clarification? First of all, it 
seems that Foucault wants to clearly distinguish the notion of conduct from the semantic field 
of sovereignty, and thus to the subject of right. Secondly, and related to this, Foucault 
highlights that the resistances that we are discussing here are situated within and against 
processes of biopolitical regulation. In the face of biopolitical mechanisms, Foucault seems to 
suggest, both resistances and practices of subjectivation cannot hinge, at least primarily, on 
rights-claims or on acts of disobedience to the law; rather, they directly involve life as such, 
not only in its biological dimension but including instead any aspects of people’s existence.  
 
Intermezzo on conducts and government 
In this regard I want to highlight, in passing, that while in 1978 and 1979 the dimension of 
government in its relationship to conduct is formed by the articulation between being 
governed/governing oneself (or being conducted by others/conducing oneself), in the Eighties 
Foucault re-centres his analytical frame around the couple governing oneself/governing 
others. Such a shift indicates, I suggest, that in the late-Seventies the issue of government is 
situated in the political and ethical question “how not to be governed in such a way and at 
that cost?” while in the Eighties Foucault’s attention focuses on how learning to govern 
oneself—in order to get a mastery over oneself and to be able to transform the power relations 
in which one is involved. Among the reasons for Foucault’s abandonment of the notion of 
counter-conduct there is also this partial shift from the primacy of the will not to be governed 
(in such a way)—that cannot but start from the condition of assujettissement of the subject and 
that necessarily entails an ambivalent relationship to the norm—towards the problem of 
getting mastery over oneself in order to change the power relationship. This does not at all 
mean that in the techniques of the self described by the late Foucault the subject acts in a pure 
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space without being shaped by power relations. However, what I want to stress is that the 
subject who asks “how not to be governed in such a way and at that cost?” must necessarily 
struggle with the constraint of interiorizing social norms and discipline when creating spaces 
of freedom. So, as far as the couple government of the self/government of others is concerned, 
the starting point is the individual—who by transforming him/herself aims to conduct 
him/herself differently and thus to transform the field of power relations.36 This slippage helps 
us to articulate the differences between counter-conducts and the forms of subjectivation that 
Foucault takes into account in the Eighties through the opposition reactive 
resistances/productive subjectivations—since, as I have shown, counter-conducts are 
eminently productive of new modes of life. And rather, in the place of such an opposition, it 
makes it possible to grasp the nuanced differences between starting from the will of not being 
governed (in such a way) and starting from the goal of transforming ourselves as ethical 
subjects.37 
 
“UNHCR is my government”: the exclusionary humanitarian regime and the biopolitics of the 
governed. 
Up to now I’ve approached the issue of the articulation between omnes and singulatim in 
counter-conducts while situating the analysis on the edges of—and beyond—the space of 
revolts of conduct tackled by Foucault and his commentators; and, to a certain extent, this 
operation has led to a pushing of the boundaries of the meaning and space of counter-
conducts by looking at struggles that Foucault had not himself described in these terms, but 
showing that they have an affinity with the semantic and political field of revolts of conduct. 
In turn, this forces us to revise the original definition of counter-conduct in the light of those 
fields of power relations that I have described. Following the main thread of this article, the 
stakes consist in interrogating how the omnes et singulatim bond is played out differently in 
spaces where the government of conduct is predicated on colonial legacies, or on “the tyranny 
of the national”38 that characterize both Foucault’s and our present. Or, to frame it from a 
slightly different angle, the question is to explore, in the spaces of the present, the mechanisms 
of individualization and the specific regime of truth that are mobilized in the government of 
non-citizen’s conducts. Thus, the government of non-citizen conducts is the specific angle 
through which I have chosen to unpack the omnes et singulatim nexus to interrogate the 
potentiality of the notion of counter-conduct today. This leads us to confront two intertwined 
forms of governmentality: migration management and the production of illegality on the one 
hand, and humanitarian government and the regime of asylum on the other. These two 
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supposedly distinct fields of migration governmentality have not only blurred the conceptual 
boundaries, migrants themselves are often captured by both regimes and pass from being 
subjects of humanitarianism to illegal migrants; concurrently, they are both based on the 
production of—degrees of—illegality, and the production of human remnants who fall 
beyond any humanitarian concern. It is precisely at the slippery borders between illegalization 
of migrant conducts and humanitarian protection that the last section of this article is situated. 
The refugee camp I focus on here is by no means a space of exception nor as a spatially 
enclosed place. On the contrary, as I have illustrated elsewhere39 the government of refugees’ 
conducts and the economy of humanitarianism that sustained the functioning of the camp 
went well beyond its spatial boundaries. Indeed, since Choucha camp it is not a closed 
reception center, refugees were allowed to move in and out of the area of the camp while at 
the same time being controlled at distance—i.e. registered and fingerprinted by Tunisian 
authorities. Moreover, in particular after the official close of the camp, in June 2013, refugees 
who remained there used the space of the camp as a site of struggle for resettlement in 
Europe. 
“We have all fled the Libyan war and thus we are all refugees, no distinction should be 
made among us”—placard written and shown by rejected refugees at the sit-in in front of 
UNHCR’s headquarters in Tunis, February 2013. “We have been living at Choucha camp, in 
the desert, for four years, without having the possibility to restart our life: so, who is the 
subject of humanitarian aid if not us?”—a dialogue with rejected refugees at Choucha camp, 
August 2014. These two statements have been formulated by the illegalized subjects of 
humanitarianism; that is, asylum seekers who arrived in Tunisia, at Choucha refugee camp 
close to the Libyan border of Ras-Ajdir, to escape the war in Libya and whose asylum claims 
have been rejected by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and 
who, because of that, have become “irregular migrants” in the Tunisian territory.40 Moreover, 
“rejected refugees’” presence at the camp soon became non-existent, since UNHCR crossed 
them out from the daily count at the camp as well as from any reported statistics. Suddenly, 
they became “people of no concern” for UNHCR’s officers who, after producing them as 
irregular migrants, declared them out of the humanitarian jurisdiction. The political 
invisibility of the rejected refugees was followed by the invisibility of the space of the camp. 
Indeed, after the official closure of Choucha camp (June 2013), many of the rejected refugees 
decided to continue to stay there as a form of ongoing struggle for a place to live. They 
demanded to be resettled in Europe saying that if they were not, they would have preferred to 
die in the desert, which is still a free space. This is our space, the space of those who escaped a 
war and are now stranded as irregular migrants in Tunisia, as irregular migrants with no 
other solution for leaving than to take a boat and cross the Mediterranean; this discourse 
shared by all rejected refugees at the camp, actualized in their spatial persistence, in their 
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refusal to leave the only space they had—the space of the ex-Choucha camp—appropriated 
the categories of the humanitarian discourse and radically redefined their meanings. In fact, in 
the face of the exclusionary criteria of asylum, and the primacy of the context of origin as a 
basis for judging if the person is in need of protection, rejected refugees at Choucha camp 
instantiated their own law of protection. However, they did that not by refusing to be 
governed by the humanitarian institution but, on the contrary, by endorsing their categories 
and twisting their exclusionary meaning up to empty them, since, as explained above, the 
regime of asylum is based on the exclusion of some—most of the time many—in order to grant 
protection to a few. Their demands and their spatial struggle insisted on the same tone: “we 
are subjects of the humanitarian, as we all escaped the war together and are stranded in the 
desert: UNHCR finish your job.”41 This request addressed to UNHCR is in part meaningless 
and in vain if we keep to the borders of humanitarian law and if we accept the rules of the 
game made by UNHCR itself. Indeed, UNHCR had fully finished its job at Choucha, a job 
that, as in any refugee camp, consists of partitioning between people deserving of 
humanitarian protection and those who do not. Nevertheless if, from the point of view of 
“humanitarian reason”42 their demand inevitably went around in circles, its non-addressability, 
its falling out of the margins established by the humanitarian regime opens up a space of 
resignification that does not simply stretch the borders of the asylum but explodes them. In 
other words, rejected refugees emptied the exclusionary basis of the asylum and refigured it as 
a protection against any deprivation of space produced by migration policies, by wars, and by 
economic exploitation. However, due to their position as “subjects of no concern” for the 
humanitarian actors, and ultimately for human rights associations generally, rejected refugees 
at Choucha camp focused the struggle on a non-discursive level, they stopped laying claims to 
institutions and instead fully endorsed the humanitarian condition that the UNHCR refused 
them. The ex-Choucha camp has become the space of the fleeing persons who left Libya as 
third-country nationals. They struggle for a space to stay—elsewhere, in Europe—using the 
same space in which they have been blocked—Choucha camp—by the juridical deadlock 
imposed on them by the UNHCR. 
The way in which revolts of conduct ultimately hinge on a “politics of the governed,”43 
or better on a biopolitics of the governed, emerge quite blatantly, I suggest, in the field of 
migration governmentality. Indeed, in that context the people of concern—those who are 
governed as ‘migrants’—are to some extent subjects eminently captured and controlled by 
policies that block and select them, and interrupt their journeys. At the same time, many of 
those who are governed as migrants are left out of any concern by humanitarian politics. 
However, as the case of Choucha shows, it is very important to underline that their condition 
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as “people of no concern” according to UNHCR’s mandate does not at all mean that they are 
out of the grip of power and mechanisms of control. On the contrary, their mobility as well as 
their possibility to stay in a space is highly hampered by the same policies that produced them 
as illegal migrants, and this precisely because of them. Mechanisms of capture through 
exclusion and mechanisms of capture through inclusion are both at play in the government of 
humanitarian-and-irregular migration. 44  Aware of their condition as subjects eminently 
governed despite and due to the exclusionary criteria of the asylum,—which illegalized them 
and crossed them out of humanitarian concern—rejected refugees at Choucha camp mobilized 
their own politics of the governed, turning it upside down. Firstly, defining themselves as 
refugees in total disregard of the denial they received, they detached the meaning of the 
category of refugee from the regime of truth of the asylum, while simultaneously detaching 
their (strategic) subjectivation45 from the juridical and social identity marked in the final 
response to their dossier—“rejected.” As subjects eminently governed precisely by those 
politics that exclude them from the capture of humanitarianism, people at Choucha camp 
endorse in their own way the qualification of “refugee” and the semantic field of 
humanitarianism. Nevertheless, their self-entitlement is not only a nominal question: they stay 
there, they persist there, and with their presence—as little visible as it could be—they 
constitute the inerasable remnants of humanitarian governmentality. Moreover, their firm 
decision to continue to live at the camp, in the desert, without any kind of assistance, 
completely unbalanced any logic of costs and benefits, and posited the “intransitivity of 
freedom”46—in this case the freedom to struggle for a space away from there, at the risk of 
dying in the desert—beyond the criteria of the humanitarians that allocate, displace, or 
constrain people within a certain space. Thus, refugees’ strategy of endorsing, by themselves 
and in their own way, the categories of the humanitarian should not be seen only as a way of 
“getting support from”47 the humanitarian system itself. Rather, their act has been perceived 
by the Tunisian government as well as by humanitarian actors as a sort of spatial disobedience—
the decision to stay there at the cost of their own life—based on the refusal to fit in the 
categories assigned by UNHCR, and the refusal to conduct their lives according to these. 
Together with this strategic endorsement of the categories of the humanitarian 
discourse and the spatial disobedience that the refugees performed, the other important aspect 
that emerges from the struggle for space made by rejected refugees at Choucha camp is the 
articulation between the level of singular subjectivities and the collective one. The common 
experience of the flight from Libya and of life in the camp produced a temporary collective 
“we” that coincided with the space of Choucha: “nous, les deboutés de Choucha” (“we, the 
rejected refugees from Choucha”) was mobilized all the time in their public demonstrations 
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and in the discussions with journalists, activists, and humanitarian actors at the camp. And it 
continued to be used by those who then moved to Tunis and settled there, as well as by some 
of those who crossed the sea and arrived in Rome or Berlin. Despite the peculiarity of the 
personal stories that each of them had to describe in detail to UNHCR’s officers at the time of 
the evaluation of their asylum claim, they asserted their common condition as escapees from a 
war and as individuals stranded in a camp, which excluded any exception being made among 
them. The unconditionality of the humanitarian protection that they posited is de facto what 
voided, while at the same time bringing to the fore, the exclusionary criteria upon which the 
asylum regime is predicated. Thus, by universalizing the right to receive asylum, they 
emptied and nullified its selective measures. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this article, it is also important to explore how the level 
of omnes and that of the singulatim are specifically intertwined with each other in the 
government of refugees. Is there effectively a conduct of truth that is presupposed and 
produced in the political technology of asylum? Are the mechanisms of subjectivation and 
assujettissement based primarily on a set of positive and normative incitements that bind the 
individual to a certain conduct that he/she is required to adopt? And, finally, is 
individualization the main way through which asylum seekers and refugees are conducted?  
The hypothesis that I put forward is that, actually, in the context of refugee 
governmentality, the term “conduct” holds quite a different ethical and political basis than the 
government of conducts whose legacies are rooted in pastoral power. Rather, what 
characterizes the production of governable subjects in the political technology of asylum is 
ultimately a government through limits that structures the field of possibilities of the asylum 
seeker. I will develop such a hypothesis relying on two main problematizations. The first one 
concerns the way in which the hold on singularities is entrenched in a government of 
multiplicities that, for all that, does not coincide with the object “population.” Firstly, as Didier 
Fassin points out, the humanitarian rationale grounds on the logic of “saving lives in 
numbers.” 48  And in fact, in this very numeric rationale the “few” who remain out of 
humanitarian concern are ultimately contemplated as the unavoidable excess of the asylum 
regime. In refugee contexts, like at Choucha camp, or when there is a group of asylum seekers 
whose asylum claims have to be processed, the partition between rejected refugees and 
beneficiaries of international protection responds to a logic of numbers and remnants—not all 
could be ‘saved’, and, vice-versa, there is a percentage that has to be granted asylum status. 
Thus, numeric criteria quite often underpins not only the partitioning and exclusionary 
mechanisms of asylum, but also the processes of subjectivation through which people are 
discursively labelled according to a certain category, and so are materially produced as 
subjects governed and controlled by migration policies. In this way, it appears that, in the 
context of refugee governmentality, subjectivation through individualization in the context of 
refugee governmentality is not primary. And individuals are “counted” as part of a temporary 
multiplicity based on spatial coexistence—like asylum seekers in a camp; it follows that 
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singular conducts are crafted from the very beginning in relation to a larger multiplicity of 
individuals that defines their being in excess or not of the expected number of acceptable 
refugees. However, I would argue, the notion of conduct does not lose its efficacy in 
describing the mechanisms of government or the production of refugees and remnants, since it 
enables us to look at subjects from the point of view of the effective “hold” of governmental 
technologies on people’s lives. Such a context pushes us to reconsider the notion of conduct by 
positing the dimension of the government of singularities as immediately entrenched in a 
government of multiplicities—that are not necessarily “populations” and that are often only 
temporary collectivities resulting from a forced spatial coexistence, like in a refugee camp. 
Secondly, the government through numbers and categories that is at the core of the 
asylum regime involves the hold on singular bodies being actually exercised predominantly 
by forcing individual stories into pre-existing profiles rather than by demanding the 
individual to produce a discourse of truth for oneself. To put it differently, despite the 
incessant production of discursivity that asylum seekers are asked to perform, it could be 
argued that it is a question of an anomalous confession, a sort of “confession without truth”49: 
indeed, the injunction to speak in detail about their personal stories does not mean that 
asylum seekers are expected to effectively endorse the discourse that they produce and to 
mould their subjectivity according to the categories by which they are labelled. Moreover, 
ultimately they are not even supposed to be conducts of truth, which is the condition to produce 
a discourse of truth about themselves; on the contrary, the entire procedure of examination of 
their asylum claim is based on a presumption of guilt. It is grounded on the assumption that 
they are potential “liars” who, by consequence, need to demonstrate that they are not the 
deceitful conducts that they are actually supposed to be until proven otherwise; echoing Frantz 
Fanon’s expression of “conduct of non-truth” referred to the suspect behaviour of the 
colonized. 50  And in order not to be “deceitful” in the act of story-telling they must be 
eminently non-contradictory with themselves.51 Therefore, in the strategic game of the asylum 
process between humanitarian actors and asylum seekers, what is at stake is not so much the 
correspondence between the conduct and the discourse of truth but rather, the struggle 
around the production of coherent narrative that could fit the set of categories that are already 
there and through which the subject will be governed—as refugee, as rejected refugee, as 
refugee to be resettled, as vulnerable person, etc. In this way, the “adherence” and the 
correspondence of the singular conduct with the discourse that it demands is not of the same 
order of truth than the one described by Foucault in his genealogy of the western modern 
subject; namely, the order of truth that presupposes that the subject is required not only to tell 
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the truth, but also to tell the truth about him/herself.52  This “gap” that always remains 
between the demand placed on subjects to tell their stories on the one hand, and the taxonomy 
of migration governmentality and the production of humanitarian conducts and irregular 
conducts53 on the other, makes room for a strategic appropriation and reversal of categories as 
was the case for rejected refugees at Choucha camp. After all, the government through 
partitioning that characterizes the asylum machine54 despite tracing limits on the movements 
and on the choices of singular conducts produces at the same time generalizable singularities, 
namely migration profiles, whose boundaries are usually blurred.  
As I have illustrated, the two mechanisms that are at stake in refugee governmentality 
are that migrant conducts are materially shaped on the basis of a government through limits, 
namely by fixing or allocating subjects to a certain place or to a certain profile; however, these 
limits are not only exclusionary, on the contrary, mechanisms of exclusion from humanitarian 
concern, and mechanisms of control and containment through identification and inclusion 
within the boundaries of the humanitarian program go together. In such a context, “conduct” 
becomes the name for designating precisely the condition of becoming governed as a migrant 
by a set of heterogeneous policies—humanitarian government; mechanisms of identification; 
production of irregular conducts. It could be suggested that, actually, in the context of the 
production of immigrant subjectivities and of the illegalization of certain of them as “irregular 
migrants” or as “rejected refugees,” the crafting of (governable) conducts is the response for 
taming troubling mobilities and practices of freedom—the freedom not only to move but also 
to have a living space.  
 
Conclusions 
Actually, when you are in a system that does not give you any explanation but that, yet, 
controls you […] I have no country, my country is UNHCR, my government is UNHCR […] 
I mean, I’m in their camp, I’m under their mandate, and they are my government since they 
are managing the camp.55  
Rejected refugees who are still at Choucha camp, struggling to get a place to stay in Europe, 
are “emptying” the exclusionary criteria of asylum positing. By claiming that they are all 
subjects of humanitarian concern, twisting the categories of humanitarianism, they push the 
limits of their condition of being governed while being “subjects of no concern”at the same 
time. As the quote below clearly shows, their impossible universal claim—“we are all 
refugees”—and their spatial disobedience at the camp, touched the core of the functioning and 
effects of the hold of power exercised over their lives. From such a perspective, the expression 
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“biopolitics of the governed” designates the mobilization of spatial claims and strategies of 
existence that starts from, and plays on, the condition of being governed by certain policies 
and of being produced as irregular conducts.  
In this article I have highlighted how we can read in-between the lines of Foucault’s 
analyses on counter-conducts and how the government of singularities (singulatim) and that of 
multiplicities (omnes) are articulated in different politics over life—showing how the collective 
dimension is directly and indirectly tackled by Foucault. The choice of re-reading some of 
Foucault’s texts in light of the notion of counter-conduct and of putting it to work in the 
present forms of governmentality should not be read as a strategy for broadening the field of 
counter-conducts as much as possible; this would bring with it the risk of losing its political 
efficacy. Rather, this gesture of making counter-conducts travel across different historical 
experiences of struggles within and against biopolitical technologies was aimed to show the 
spaces of subjectivation that revolts of conduct can open, and thus, to analyse in a more 
productive way the term “counter” that is actually implied in all forms of resistance. 
Moreover, it enables us to redefine the boundaries of the notion of counter-conduct in light of 
revolts of conduct enacted by people in the face of political technologies that subjectivize, 
govern, and subjugate them in quite a different way than the pastoral power described by 
Foucault in Security, Territory, Population. 
However, coming back to a crucial point already mentioned in this article, we cannot 
overstate struggles of conduct and against (a certain) conduct in an abstract way without taking 
seriously the risk of pathologization and of production of marginality that “counter-conducts” 
often run. The ongoing story of rejected refugees at Choucha camp is quite exemplary in this 
sense: how could a radical claim or a struggle of conducts generate an effect that is not one of 
mere marginalization when total political invisibility is imposed on them? The collective level 
on which I have focused my attention here as a provisional and strategic “we” emerging as the 
outcome of the struggles of conduct is certainly one of the orientations that could open up 
unexpected spaces of subjectivation that is worth further exploration.  
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